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The Reagan Administration and the 
Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon 
and Libya as Case Studies 
MATTIA TOALDO
*
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT This article uses recently declassified records to analyze the American 
intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 and the confrontation with Libya between 
1981 and 1986. In both cases, the US responded to a terrorist attack with military force. 
Especially after the attacks in Lebanon, members of the administration started to elaborate a 
comprehensive strategy to fight terrorism which focused on pre-emptive strikes against states 
deemed to be supporters of terrorism. The strike on Libya in April 1986 was the first 
implementation of this strategy and, furthermore, regime change had been attempted both 
before and after this strike. The article argues that the policy of the Reagan administration in 
the fight against terrorism was a combination of two factors: the global Cold War mindset 
and the first elaboration of concepts that would later become part of the Bush 
administration’s War on Terror. Rather than being the beginning of the War on Terror, 
however, Reagan’s policy should be considered as a source of inspiration for it, albeit one 
that was deeply influenced by the bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
 
Introduction 
While reading records and speeches from the Reagan administration, one might be surprised 
to stumble upon some concepts that would become popular only in the following millennium. 
A good example is the speech delivered by Secretary of State George Shultz at the Park 
Avenue Synagogue a few days before the 1984 presidential elections: 
We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense 
to consider means of active prevention, pre-emption and retaliation [...] The public must 
understand before the fact that occasions will come when their government must act before 
each and every fact is known [...] We will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in a 
variety of ways, at times and places of our own choosing. [...] There will be no time for 
renewed national debate after every terrorist attack. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean and 
pleasant contest. [...] There is no room for guilt or self-doubt about our right to defend a way of 
life that offers all nations hope for peace, progress and human dignity.
1
 
These concepts do sound familiar to those who witnessed the War on Terror of the early 
2000s but one should not over-emphasize them: “World War 4” did not start in the Reagan 
years as Andrew Bacevich provocatively asserted, though that administration can be 
considered its source of inspiration.
2
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The Reagan administration did not start a comprehensive new policy against terrorism. 
Rather, it experimented with tools and ideas that later were incorporated into Bush‟s War on 
Terror, including the following: the analysis of terrorism as a form of warfare which implied 
a military rather than solely a law enforcement response by the US, the use of pre-emptive 
strikes against states which were deemed to be supporters of a worldwide network of 
terrorism, and the need to overthrow the regimes that supported terrorists. These, however, 
were just experiments and were contentious inside the administration. This “experimental” 
phase ended shortly after the strike against Libya and the outbreak of the Iran-Contra scandal 
in the second half of 1986. It seems incorrect to argue that there was continuity in the 
American government‟s terrorism policy between the Reagan and the second Bush 
administration given that the Bush senior and Clinton administrations implemented few of 
Shultz‟s ideas. Nevertheless, the Reagan administration‟s anti-terrorism policy was highly 
influenced by a second element: a vigorous dedication to rolling back Soviet inroads in the 
third world and in the Middle East through the fight against Soviet proxies. The members of 
this administration had risen to policy prominence during the Cold War and their mindsets, 
along with their understanding of events, were deeply influenced by this. This article, 
therefore, argues that the policy of the Reagan administration against Middle Eastern 
terrorism was the combination of the following two elements: the birth of some of the themes 
and ideas of what would later be called the War on Terror and the influence of Cold War 
paradigms and concerns. In the context of this argument, it is important to assess how much 
of what was put forward in the War on Terror of the early 2000s was deeply rooted in the 
Cold War reality and mindset of the Reagan administration.  
The first section of this article describes the context of the policy of the Reagan 
administration, including its continuity with traditional US policy during the Cold War and its 
reaction to the regional events of 1979, the most significant of these being the Iranian 
revolution. In the second section, two case studies are used to analyze Reagan‟s policy 
against Middle Eastern terrorism: Lebanon, where US troops suffered two relevant terrorist 
attacks, and Libya, which was bombed by the US after it was linked to a long string of 
terrorist attacks against Americans. The third and the fourth sections examine the two main 
elements of Reagan‟s policy which have been briefly outlined above.  
A note on terminology: it is important to clarify that the words “terrorism” and 
“terrorist” in this article indicate individuals, groups or governments which were considered 
as such by the US administration. These words were applied to people and situations which 
did not always fit into the standard definition of terrorism, which is an act of violence 
committed against individuals with the explicit goal of spreading terror.
3
 As will be discussed 
later, the broad labelling of a number of organizations and governments with very different 
ideologies, structures and aims as “terrorists” or supporters of “terrorism” by American 
policy-makers served to further obscure what was already a region which few people in the 
administration understood. Also, the term “war on terror” is used to describe the Reagan 
administration‟s policies pertaining to terrorism whereas War on Terror is used to describe 
the policies of President George W. Bush. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Win World War 4‟, Commentary, Volume 113, no. 2, (February 2002), p. 28. See also, Eliot Cohen, „World 
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and Daniel Pipes, „Who's the Enemy?‟, Commentary, Volume 113, no.1, (January 2002), p. 22. 
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The Context of Reagan Administration Policy against Middle Eastern Terrorism 
The policy of the Reagan administration against Middle Eastern terrorism can be considered 
as predominantly “globalist”, meaning one that relied on the global conceptual frameworks of 
the Cold War to understand regional events and to take decisions.
4
 The alternative approach, 
which was overshadowed by the influence of the globalists inside the administration, can be 
defined as “regionalist”. It assigns a decisive role to local actors and regional history to 
understand events and define policy. Especially during its first years in office, the Reagan 
administration tended to ascribe events in the Middle East to the superpower chess-game, 
rather than emphasize regional dynamics. Moreover, the globalist approach was in line with 
the traditional US hierarchy of priorities in the Middle East, which prioritized the fight 
against the Soviets and their regional allies. The Reagan administration followed this 
tradition while also sharing two other priorities with past administrations: guaranteeing the 
security of Israel and defending access to oil sources. This hierarchy of priorities, and thus 
the prevalence of the concern for Soviet inroads into the region, greatly affected the “choice 
of enemies” by the Reagan administration as it had for past administrations.5 Starting from 
the 1960s, successive US administrations had divided regional actors into two main 
categories: nationalists and radicals on one side and traditionalists and conservatives on the 
other. The latter group, usually called “Arab moderates”, would generally become the allies 
of the US and the “West”.6 
The problems faced by the Reagan administration pertained to the changes in the 
regional context. Starting from the 1970s, conditions in the region had moved farther away 
from the binary logic of the Cold War while political Islam started to play a growing role in 
international diplomacy. As Fawaz Gerges has argued, few American policy-makers 
understood the relevance of these changes, even after the 1979 Iranian revolution.
7
 Rashid 
Khalidi is even more explicit on this point when he writes that the “Cold War logic” led 
superpowers to neglect the reality on the ground and rely on the Cold War chess game to 
shape policy and local alliances “whether for the United States in Lebanon in 1983 or for the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s”.8 
The other major factor in Reagan‟s policy was the declaration of a particular kind of 
anti-terrorism strategy which, as Lawrence Freedman has pointed out, “could be interpreted 
either as a reference to a real war or a rhetorical device to mobilize the nation to address some 
great problem”.9 In this version of the fight against terrorism, there were differences within 
the administration with the President playing an important role as well. Ronald Reagan, as far 
as declassified records and memoirs show, was not very involved in the concrete, day-to-day 
shaping of US strategy in the Middle East which was the result of the convergence (or 
competition) of the diverse views present inside the administration. George Shultz strove to 
become the main strategist for the anti-terrorism strategy in the administration, particularly 
                                                          
4
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6
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7
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after 1984. His views on how to implement this fight against terrorism, however, were not 
shared by other members of the cabinet such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. 
Other, less prominent figures in the NSC and its staff also played a substantial role, making 
the picture even more complex.
10
 This is why it is worth taking into account not just 
Reagan‟s words and deeds, but also those of other administration members.11 
Shultz‟s ideas emerged in a series of speeches delivered mainly during 1984, the most 
important of which was the one delivered at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York.
12
 In 
this speech, Schultz argued that the fight against terrorism was a struggle to defend a way of 
life and a civilization, and that the US needed to use pre-emptive strikes to achieve this goal. 
This implied the need to extend executive powers in order to strike terrorists and their 
sponsors in a timely and effective way. Weinberger, on the other hand, feared that any strike 
of this fashion would be merely an empty show of force without bringing concrete, positive 
effects on the capability of terrorists to strike against the US. 
Other themes were more broadly shared within the administration and can be 
considered the most solid part of its legacy. These included the idea of terrorism as a form of 
warfare rather than as simply a heinous crime, the existence of sponsor-states which were all 
linked into a “terror network”, and the need to seek opportunities to carry out regime change 
in these countries. Interestingly, regime change, as James Mann has noted, was not linked to 
the promotion of democracy until the last years of the Reagan administration.
13
 Moreover, the 
US foreign policy community focused on terrorism as a tactic rather than on those who 
practiced it in the 1980s, meaning that the enemy was “terrorism” (i.e. the phenomenon or the 
technique of warfare) rather than the different terrorist organizations. Importantly, it was this 
view that allowed the Reaganites to fit it into their view of the Cold War. 
These factors were at work at a time when Middle Eastern terrorism was becoming 
more prominent. This had begun with the hostage crisis in Tehran but became all the more 
evident with the remarkable succession of events between 1983 and 1986 (such as the 
bombing of the US Marines in Beirut in 1983 and the shootings in European airports during 
Christmas vacation in 1985). These events outraged the administration and spread doubts 
about US credibility at home and abroad. The Reagan administration was therefore forced to 
think – and to think very fast given the pace of some of these incidents – about policies which 
could constitute an effective response to terrorism. 
Two elements must be singled out as the most relevant in the development of the War 
on Terror during the Reagan years: the rising number of American victims – which increased 
the relevance of the issue of terrorism to the American public – and the use of American 
military power as a reaction to terrorist attacks. In the US interventions in Lebanon and in 
Libya, both of these elements played a major role. A very significant part of the legacy of the 
                                                          
10
 Some authors stress the role of Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and North; see for instance Sean Wilentz, The 
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produced a high number of memoirs: Robert Gates, From the Shadows: the Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five 
Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Touchstone, 1996); Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, 
Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984); Ronald Reagan, An American 
Life (New York: Pocket Books, 1999); George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph. My Years as a Secretary of State 
(New York: MacMillan, 1993); Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990). 
12
 See his memoirs: George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 648; and also Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of 
Enemies, pp. 147-48. 
13
 James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York: Viking, 2004), pp. 
127-38. 
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administration in the War on Terror comes from its reaction to events in these countries, both 
in terms of actual policies and in terms of public and private discussion. 
Libya, Lebanon, and Libya Again 
The Reagan administration had entered office while the hostage crisis in Tehran was coming 
to an end. The challenge to American credibility and to the safety of its citizens abroad posed 
by the events in Iran (and more broadly by terrorism) was merely a harbinger of what would 
follow during the 1980s. The administration was also concerned with Soviet inroads into the 
region. To this end, Reagan‟s first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, tried to build an anti-
Soviet “strategic consensus” among Arab allies and Israel14 while blaming the Soviets for the 
rise of international terrorism.
15
 
The Libyan dictator Mu‟ammar al-Qadhafi provided the Reagan administration with a 
golden opportunity to restore US military and political credibility after Vietnam and the 
failed rescue mission in Iran, and to fight Soviet proxies (or presumed Soviet proxies). 
Qadhafi, indeed, was accused of supporting international terrorism and having a close 
relationship with Moscow, thus filling both roles exceedingly well in the minds of 
administration officials.
16
 As a result of this, the administration escalated tensions with 
Qadhafi, first by the closure of the Libyan embassy in Washington in May of 1981 and then 
the planning of several “Freedom of Navigation” exercises in the Gulf of Sidra, which 
Qadhafi claimed as Libyan territorial waters. In August, a Libyan plane was shot down after 
firing at two American F-14s during one of these drills. The Libyan dictator would again be 
in the spotlight in the following years although from mid-1982 to 1984 the attention of the 
administration would shift to Lebanon.
17
 
On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon with the goal of uprooting the infrastructure 
of the PLO and eliminating the threat to the security of its northern borders. American policy-
makers had been somewhat vaguely informed about the Israeli plan to invade Lebanon, 
though not everyone was aware of Sharon‟s plan to go as far as Beirut.18 In an attempt to 
move Lebanon towards peace, the administration decided to form a multinational force 
(MNF), together with France and Italy, with the goal of helping the PLO fighters withdraw 
from Beirut, thus ending Israel‟s ostensible reason for being there. The evacuation was 
completed by August 30 and the MNF withdrew on September 10. That month, Lebanon was 
shaken first by the murder of the newly elected President Bashir Gemayel and then by the 
massacre in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps. The US, which through Philip 
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15
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Habib had brokered a deal that guaranteed the safety of the Palestinians in Beirut, sent a 
second multinational force (now also including the United Kingdom) with a broader, virtually 
undefined, goal of establishing a “presence” while American diplomats could work on an 
agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments. This agreement was intended to 
bring about the withdrawal of both the IDF and the Syrian forces, which had been deployed 
in Lebanon since 1976 with the goal of containing the instability generated by the civil war.
19
 
The irony is that, with the failure of this strategy, both the IDF and the Syrian troops would 
stay in Lebanon well beyond 1982: the former would not completely withdraw from Lebanon 
until 2000 and the latter stayed until 2005. In 1983, the US contingent found itself more and 
more involved in the civil war while coming under attack by Islamist terrorists twice: first on 
April 18, when the US embassy in Beirut was hit, resulting in the death of 63 people 
including 17 Americans; second on October 23, when 241 US soldiers were killed by a truck 
bomb in their barracks at Beirut‟s airport. The administration discussed retaliation, 
specifically against the Sheik Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek where the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards had allegedly trained the terrorists that had struck against the Marines.
20
 Two 
attempts to strike these targets were made in November by the French and another in early 
December by the US, all of which were unsuccessful. On 17 February 1984, a memo by 
Robert McFarlane officially informed both Shultz and Weinberger that the president had 
decided on the „redeployment‟ of the Marines.21 The pull-out was completed by February 26, 
1984. This year was the peak of Shultz‟s campaign in favour of a tougher stance against 
terrorism by the administration. While a National Security Decision Directive was approved 
to this end (NSDD 138), no real decision was taken on the means and strategy which could be 
adopted in the fight against terrorism. 
1985 would be, for many years to come, the “annus horribilis” of the American fight 
against terror. In June came the hijacking of flight TWA 847 which lasted almost three weeks 
and led to the death of Navy Petty Officer Robert Stethem. During the summer, the 
administration discussed various methods of overthrowing Qadhafi but never carried these 
out. October brought the hijacking of the Italian cruise-ship Achille Lauro with 12 Americans 
on board, among them Leon Klinghoffer, a disabled Jewish-American who would be killed 
by the Palestinian terrorists. Last came the shootings in the airports of Vienna and Rome on 
December 27 which left 19 people dead.
22
 
1986 began with Reagan administration plans to confront Qadhafi again in the Gulf of 
Sidra because he had strong ties with the terrorists from Abu Nidal‟s Organization (ANO), 
which had claimed responsibility for the attacks in the airports.
23
 On March 24, several 
Libyans were killed and six Soviet technicians were wounded in an air battle between US and 
Libyan planes during yet another US military exercise in the Gulf of Sidra referred to as 
“Freedom of Navigation” operations.24 Qadhafi‟s response came only a few days later. On 
                                                          
19
 On the debate inside the administration before the deployment of MNF 2, see the paper presented by Robert 
Murray (Harvard University), Lebanon intervention 1982-1983, Tower Board files, Ronald Reagan Library, 
Simi Valley, CA (From now on: RRL). 
20
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East, Lebanon Chronology (1), Box 41, Executive Secretariat NSC, Country files, RRL. 
21
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22
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Spot; David E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990); David C. Wills, The First War 
on Terrorism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
23
 Cable from JCS, “Warning Order for Operation Prairie Fire”, 28 December 1985, Folder: 1-6-86 NSPG 
Libya, Elaine Morton Files, RRL. 
24
 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 680; Joseph Stanik, El Dorado Canyon, pp. 127-43. 
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the night of April 5, a bomb blew up in La Belle discotheque in West Berlin where many US 
servicemen spent their free time. Two people were killed and 155 were wounded, a third of 
them Americans. According to Bernd Schäfer's research in the Stasi archives, the terrorists 
had acted on instructions from the Libyan embassy in East Berlin with the knowledge of the 
East German intelligence agency. They later sent a cable to Libyan intelligence headquarters 
in Tripoli to confirm the “execution of one of the actions” which was intercepted by US 
intelligence.
25
 
On April 15 at 2 a.m. Tripoli time, US planes started to bomb several locations in 
Tripoli and Benghazi. This was 7 p.m. Washington time, and the attack was shown live by 
NBC and CNN. It was, as Roland Bruce St. John has commented, “the first prime-time 
bombing in the nation's history.”26 Efforts on Libya did not stop there, as attempts at 
overthrowing Qadhafi were carried out in the summer of 1986.
27
 These actions, as will be 
discussed below, were the pinnacle of Schultz‟s influence on anti-terror policy. A major 
scandal helped to put an end to this influence as some of Schultz‟s allies in the administration 
would become embroiled in the Iran-Contra affair and were forced to resign.
28
 Schultz‟s 
attempt at this more robust response to terrorism was not continued by his immediate 
successors.
29
 
The Influence of the Cold War on Reagan’s War on Terror 
Through the reaction to events in Lebanon and Libya, new ideas about the fight against 
terrorism were elaborated. Nevertheless, these reactions were deeply influenced by the Cold 
War mindset deeply engrained into the members of administration: it conditioned their 
understanding of reality, their choice of enemies, their day-to-day decision-making and the 
way they presented issues to Congress or the public. The Cold War “globalist” mindset 
played a great role in the failed understanding of Middle Eastern regional dynamics. Driven 
by a “Cold War logic”, as Khalidi has labelled it,30 the Reagan administration did not fully 
understand the consequences of what had happened in the Muslim world in 1979. This year 
marked the beginning of the 15
th
 century in the Islamic calendar and, indeed, it was a new era 
that was taking shape in the Muslim world. In 1979, General Zia started what he called the 
“Islamization” of Pakistan, discarding British common law and instating Islamic law in its 
place. In Saudi Arabia on November 20 (New Year‟s Day in the Islamic calendar) a crowd of 
religious hard-liners opposed to the rule of the Saud family took control of the Great Mosque 
in Mecca. They surrendered only after a siege that lasted for two weeks. 1979, above all, 
would see the evolution of Islamic fundamentalism into the main ideology of one of the most 
important states in the region: Iran. As French scholar Gilles Kepel wrote, “after 1979 no one, 
in the Muslim world and beyond, ignored the expansion of the Islamic phenomenon”.31 
                                                          
25
 Bernd Schäfer, „New Evidence on 1986 U.S. Air Raid on Libya: A Confidential Soviet Account from the 
Stasi Archives‟, Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive, 
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 Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States, p. 137. 
27
 See below, the discussion of the “Flower” plan under the heading “Terrorism, Terrorists and the Way to 
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28
 The scandal, uncovered in the fall of 1986, was about American arms sales to Iran in exchange for the 
liberation of US citizens held hostage in Lebanon. Funds earned through this sale were allegedly used to fund 
the anti-Communist guerrillas in Nicaragua, namely the Contras. See Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (eds.), 
The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New Press, 1993). 
29
 „Key Sections of Shultz Press Talk on Libya and Other Issues‟, The New York Times (18 April 1986) 
30
 Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis, p. XV. 
31
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Although it is true that the Reagan administration did not ignore this phenomenon, their 
reading of it led them to see each local player as either associated with the Soviet threat or as 
aligned against it. They neglected the fact that the 1979 revolution in Iran had created 
regional cleavages and new threats for the US which did not exactly fit into this bipolar 
competition.
32
 This misreading had started with the President himself. Speaking on 
September 3, 1980, Reagan so described the events of the previous year: 
We are approaching a flashpoint in this tragic process, with Soviet power now deployed in a 
manner which directly threatens Iran, the Persian Gulf and the Arab sea; with Soviet forces and 
proxy forces building up again in the region; with Soviet fleets and air bases emplaced along 
the sea lanes on which we and our Allies and the entire free world depend.
33
 
Regional actors, however, seemed to have different concerns. Many of the more secular Arab 
governments saw the Islamic revolution as a threat to the stability of their regimes, which 
prompted them to side with Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988). The 
global Cold War, rather than being a cause of that conflict, would at times be used by both 
countries to win the support of one of the two superpowers (or both) in a typical case of 
superpower manipulation.
34
 
The misreading of the new regional cleavages, however, was not a distinctive feature of 
the Reagan administration but was, as with other aspects of foreign policy, actually in 
continuity with the last years of the Carter administration. In his famous “arc of crisis” 
memorandum, for example, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained to 
President Carter how the political vacuum in this area “might well be filled by elements more 
sympathetic to the Soviet Union.”35 What followed was the return of the Carter 
administration to a typical Cold War mentality which in the Middle East implied a confusion 
between radical nationalists and Soviet clients. Regional events were seen, by both Carter and 
Reagan, through the lens of the zero-sum game with the USSR. To be fair, this view was not 
entirely unjustified. As Kepel bluntly notes, in 1979 the US had lost one of its main allies (the 
Shah) while the Soviets seemed to have conquered a new stronghold in Afghanistan, gaining 
a vantage point to the strategic Persian Gulf.
36
 
In the Reagan administration‟s analysis, Soviet power now directly threatened Iran, the 
Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea.
37
 Moreover Reagan‟s positions dovetailed nicely with 
those of the „Committee on Present Danger‟, a hawkish group of Washington foreign policy 
insiders, which argued that the Carter administration had underestimated the worldwide 
Soviet offensive. According to this Committee, it was now time for a counteroffensive which 
should overcome the legacy of inhibitions left by the Vietnam War. Fifty members of the 
Committee had been appointed to posts in the Reagan administration. These officials would 
advance their agenda supported by aggressive conservative think tanks such as the Heritage 
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Foundation, which had identified eight extra-European countries in which Soviet influence 
could be rolled back. Among them was Libya.
38
 
While Libya was under scrutiny, at least initially, as part of the confrontation with the 
USSR, the Lebanese Shiites were neglected because of this Cold War logic. As US 
Ambassador in Beirut Robert S. Dillon recollected, “the Shiites, although the largest group, 
were usually ignored [...] [Washington] was more concerned with the possibility of Russian 
influence in these groups and the alliances with the Syrians”.39 The formation of the “party of 
God”, or Hezbollah, in the early 1980s was the result of disdain for Lebanon‟s old patronage 
politics mixed with political mobilization of the previously marginalized Shiites by Imam 
Musa al-Sadr. Despite his mysterious disappearance in Tripoli (Libya) in the summer of 
1978, his followers did not dwindle and they came to be fascinated by the example of the 
1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Their project was accelerated by the Israeli invasion of the 
country in 1982 and grew thanks also to Syrian and Iranian support.
40
 Thus Hezbollah was a 
reaction to the marginalization of the Shiites in the old Lebanese confessional system and, 
internationally, had more to do with the Iranian Islamic revolution than with the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War. As recognized by Howard Teicher, who covered several positions in the 
NSC staff during the Reagan administration, the significance of the birth of this organization 
in the first half of the 1980s was not apparent to US policy-makers.
41
  
The Cold War did not just provoke the American misreading of events; it was also a 
source of manipulation by local actors who wanted more support from one of the 
superpowers. The Lebanese Christians, for instance, would compete for American support in 
the name of defending Western values against the threat posed by Soviet proxies and Arab 
radicals.
42
 By the same token, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin would also raise the 
issue of Soviet support for Palestinian terrorists in his meeting with Reagan a few days after 
the invasion of Lebanon: 
There is no doubt – Begin said – that far more than simply arming the PLO, the Soviets had 
made Lebanon the center of Soviet activity in the Middle East [...] Based on documents [the 
Israelis] had captured, it was clear that a terror network sponsored by the Soviets and involving 
Hungary, Bulgaria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Pakistan, India, the People's 
Republic of China, East Germany and Austria were all involved in assisting the PLO.
43
 
Begin was either mistaken or was trying to get Reagan‟s attention with an overstatement. 
While the Palestinian National Movement had received some support both from the Soviet 
Union and from other countries in the Soviet bloc in its early stages, there is no evidence that 
the PLO in Lebanon in the 1980s was a Soviet proxy. Indeed, there is actually evidence to the 
contrary: the enemies of the PLO within the Palestinian movement, namely Abu Nidal‟s 
Fatah-Revolutionary Council, had received training in East Germany.
44
 Moreover, the need to 
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fight Soviet influence in the Middle East was not at the top of the Israeli government‟s 
agenda because its main concern was destroying the PLO “state-within-a-state”, reducing 
Syrian influence, and creating a friendly Lebanese regime. Nevertheless, Begin and his 
cabinet had sensed that framing these goals in Cold War terms would help convince the 
Reagan administration not to oppose Israel‟s invasion of Lebanon.45 
The Cold War mindset was crucial for day-to-day decision-making inside the 
administration. During the summer of 1982 the National Security Council met to discuss 
what to do with respect to the heavy Israeli bombings of Beirut, which seemed to slow down 
the negotiations between US Presidential Envoy Philip Habib and the PLO. On the table were 
several options, ranging from a private letter to Begin asking him to simply stop the invasion, 
to unilateral military sanctions against Israel. According to the minutes of the meeting, 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick then stated that the group should not lose sight of the fact that the PLO 
is not a bunch of agrarian reformers. They are international terrorists who are working against 
US interests and committing acts of violence throughout the world supported by the Soviet 
Union. We want them out and the US should not throw away the possibility of getting rid of the 
PLO by taking measures against Israel [...] Clearly, once we have removed the PLO from 
Lebanon we can make fast progress in the peace process. 
The President, who seemed not to pay attention to the other aspects of the discussion, 
intervened to say that he agreed and asked, “How do we inform the PLO of the situation and 
the need to get out?” The meeting, which had started with a focus on Israeli deeds, ended 
with President Reagan saying that “any statement should have half of its emphasis on the 
PLO. We must make it clear that the president cannot tee-off only on Israel.”46 While sticking 
to the Cold War mindset, the members of the Reagan administration had to cope with the 
ever increasing threat of Middle Eastern terrorism. This was now perceived as a form of 
warfare waged by enemies of Western civilization supported by a network of states hostile to 
the US. 
Starting to Elaborate the War on Terror 
In the Reagan years, the perception of terrorism changed also because it became much more 
lethal for US citizens. Still in 1980 it had killed only ten Americans, less than the number 
killed by lightning in that calendar year. In a meeting in the White House on January 26, 
1981, then Head of the State Department Office for Combating Terrorism, Anthony 
Quainton, called terrorism a “manageable threat.”47 This could hardly be said after the attack 
against the Marines‟ barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983. Writing to the President about 
that attack, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger compared it to “an act of warfare”.48 
The vision of terrorism as warfare was common to many members of the administration 
but their differences lay in the response to this threat. Weinberger, on the one hand, was not 
enthusiastic about fighting terrorism with military means. He always argued in favour of a 
“focused” response and only when there was a clear “smoking gun”.49 Weinberger, though, 
was merely reacting to the campaign waged by his fellow cabinet member George Shultz. In 
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a series of speeches and hearings he gave during 1984, Shultz emphasized the nature of 
terrorism as a form of asymmetrical war. He also underlined how this new threat 
fundamentally changed the nature of the challenge before US armed forces and policy-
makers.
50
 
The ideas that would later partly form George H. W. Bush‟s War on Terror also had 
their roots in an exchange between American and Israeli right-wing politicians. In June 1984, 
Israeli and American right-wing policy-makers met in Washington DC at the Jonathan 
Institute which had been created by the Netanyahu family to honour the memory of their son 
who had died in 1976 while rescuing Israeli hostages at Entebbe. The goal of the institute was 
to mobilize public opinion and policy-makers on the need to fight terrorism and its sponsor 
states. At this meeting, Shultz argued in favour of “preventive or pre-emptive actions against 
terrorist groups before they strike”,51 and he would again make his point in the above-
mentioned speech at the Park Avenue Synagogue a few days before the 1984 presidential 
elections. The proceedings of this conference were later published in a book edited by 
Netanyahu himself entitled Terrorism: How the West Can Win.
52
 When it came out in 1986 it 
became one of Reagan‟s favourite books.53 
The thoughts expressed in this conference are among the most “modern” in Reagan‟s 
Middle East legacy. For example, there was a clear definition of the fight against terrorism as 
a struggle for civilization. As Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Moshe Arens stated, terrorism 
was “a war against Western society”. Jeanne Kirkpatrick stressed the existence of “affinities 
between terrorism and totalitarianism”, stating that “both regard violence as an appropriate 
means to their political ends. Both use it as the instruments of first resort. Both reject the 
basic moral principles of Judeo-Christian civilization.”54 The fight against terrorism was 
therefore a climatic one for Western civilizations, much like the one against Communist 
totalitarianism. Having determined the ideological links between terrorists and the Soviet 
Union, it was only logical (in the Cold War sense) that the USSR was behind a network of 
states which supported terrorists. 
A few weeks before the conference, on April 3, 1984, National Security Decision 
Directive 138 was approved. In the interpretation of some members of the administration, it 
partially shifted “policy focus from passive to active defence measures”, as National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane wrote.
55
 Inside the administration, Shultz had been the strongest 
advocate of pre-emptive strikes against terrorists. The strike against Libya in April 1986 can 
be considered a first implementation of Shultz‟s new strategy and of McFarlane‟s 
interpretation of NSSD 138. In his post-strike address to the nation, Reagan defined the 
mission both as “fully consistent” with Article 51 of the UN charter which decreed that 
nations had the right to self-defense and as a “pre-emptive action against terrorist 
installations”.56 Though pre-emptive strikes against a terrorist sponsor state had been 
experimented with for the first time, they would not become the official policy of the Reagan 
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administration. Rather than a new beginning, the 1986 strike would serve more as a model of 
how force – especially that of the Air Force – could be used for a specific political goal.57 
The discussion inside the administration focused on the nature of the threat and on the 
kind of reaction that the US had to display in the face of this threat. Little attention was 
devoted to the enemies, apart from the indication of a series of states which sponsored them. 
During the Reagan years few analysts appreciated the difference between national liberation 
organizations and terrorist groups, as well as the impact of groups such as the Abu Nidal 
Organization which, though relying on state support, had political, financial and military 
autonomy.
58
 Intelligence on transnational terrorism had been elaborated well before the 
Reagan administration. In 1976, the CIA had warned that “transnational terrorism” 
represented the “wave of the future” and was “largely independent of – and quite resistant to 
control by – the state-centered international system”.59 The subsequent administrations did 
not heed or apparently comprehend this warning. 
While the CIA was issuing those warnings, the alternative idea of a terror network 
supported by some national governments also started to gain ground among US policy-
makers. In this view terrorism was a new tool used by old enemies, namely the Soviets and 
their allies which aimed at the destabilization of the West. Thanks to this conceptual 
framework, some members of the Reagan administration transferred many of the ideas they 
had developed about the Cold War to Middle Eastern terrorism. One of the occasions for the 
elaboration of this idea was the first conference convened by the Jonathan Institute in 
Jerusalem in 1979, during which the participants concluded that the Soviets were behind a 
vast network composed by the “newly transformed Iran”, Libya, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, 
the PLO, the Armenian ASALA, the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Brigades.
60
 It is 
worth pointing out how this analysis, which was elaborated while the Iranian revolution was 
taking place, remained unchanged during the 1980s when the consequences of the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic were evident to the vast majority of those who 
observed events in the regions. 
Later, the idea of this global network became the basis of a book by journalist Claire 
Sterling entitled The Terrorist Network
61
 which served as a source of inspiration for some 
members of the administration.
62
 The book predicted that the 1980s would become “Fright 
Decade II” implying that the first of these was the 1970s. According to Sterling, the main 
feature of this new era was terrorism used as a “continuation of war by other means” to 
destabilize the West. Similar to the analyses of terrorism mentioned above, she based her 
analysis on a Cold War logic which bore little resemblance to the Middle East of the 1980s. 
While she wrote about “left-wing, or red, terrorists”, the regional scene was increasingly 
dominated by radical groups based on the Palestinian cause or Islamic fundamentalism. 
Sterling, consequently, equated the kidnapping of Italian statesman Aldo Moro by Italian 
communists with the hostage crisis in Teheran.
63
 
She was not alone. During the transition from the Carter administration, Constantine 
Menges, later Special Assistant to the President for Latin America, had identified a 
“destabilization coalition” composed of the USSR, Libya, Cuba, Yemen and Syria, against 
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which he advocated a tougher US stance.
64
 Those who supported this idea apparently were 
not deterred by the lack of reliable intelligence on the link between the Soviets and the 
Middle Eastern states deemed to be supporters of terrorism. The link between the Soviet 
Union and terrorism was apparent to Secretary of State Alexander Haig who, early in 1981, 
was ordered to draft a special national estimate that could prove this point. According to 
Robert Gates, at the time in charge of the Executive Staff of the Director of Central 
Intelligence, several drafts had to be written in order to reach this goal. Finally, “an old hand 
in the estimates business” crafted what became SNIE 11/2-81 on “Soviet Support for 
International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence.”65 The report put everything in the same 
box: terrorists and counterinsurgencies with violent radical groups, the Palestinians with the 
Italian Red Brigades. The connection between all of these groups was their use of the terrorist 
technique, as if the (relevant) cultural and ideological differences among them did not matter. 
The focus of this analysis was the hypothetical master-mind of the global terror network, not 
the particularities of each organization. In the end, though, the report did not give Haig what 
he wanted, namely the evidence of the existence of a worldwide terrorist network supported 
by (and alive only because of) the Soviet Union. The report explicitly said that “even a 
complete withdrawal” of Soviet support would not end international terrorism as both “Libya 
and the extreme Palestinian groups have ample independent resources”. Moreover, the 
estimate, if read closely, denied the very need for such a powerful supporter as the USSR: 
“The weapons needed for terrorist activities are relatively cheap and readily available in the 
world.”66 This was the feature which made terrorism all the more convenient for those who 
carried it out. It was cheap, it was relatively easy, and it produced serious political 
consequences in the Western world by killing people while they were attending to their daily 
lives. 
But these remarks, along with those written in 1976 by the CIA, were part of an 
alternative view of terrorism which was not popular in the Reagan years, one that stressed the 
role of transnational terrorist organizations and that emphasized the ideological differences 
among them. The idea of state-sponsorship and the fact that those states were all dictatorships 
could easily induce the reader to conclude that regime change was a logical next step. 
Nevertheless, the link between the denunciation of state-sponsorship and the efforts towards 
regime change was not altogether evident in the early years of the Reagan administration. 
Moreover, whenever regime change was considered as an option in a given situation, it was 
considered in its traditional form – overthrowing a hostile government and substituting it with 
a friendlier one – rather than as a tool to promote democracy. 
In the summer of 1985 (in the same weeks in which the “arms-for-hostages” deal was 
starting to take shape, where the US would provide weapons to Iran in exchange for the 
American hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon), the National Security Council discussed a 
plan to overthrow Qadhafi. The project, named “Flower”, actually included 2 different plans: 
“Tulip” focused on cooperation between Egypt and the remains of the NSFL,67 while “Rose” 
would be a “pre-emptive military attack” coordinated with Egypt. In both cases the US would 
be involved, though its role would be more overt in the “Rose” plan.68 Eventually, however, 
“Flower” was aborted because Mubarak decided against Egyptian participation and because 
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of leaks to the American press. Above all, the plan was unpopular both inside the 
administration and with US diplomats in the region. 
The rationale for acting against Qadhafi was that this would prove US resolve to its 
Middle Eastern enemies while not endangering ongoing arms reduction negotiations with the 
Soviets, as explained by the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff Donald Fortier to 
Robert McFarlane: 
Libya has the longest record in support of terrorism [...] it was also judged to be the easiest to 
attack without running up against a more serious Soviet challenge [...] Our hope, then, was to 
send a signal to those other countries indirectly [underlined, name of other countries classified] 
through a truly decisive action in Libya.
69
 
Supporters of regime change in Libya would again propose their plans in the aftermath of the 
April 1986 strike. The plan was to use disinformation to stir up Qadhafi‟s suspicions about 
his own officer corps and thus induce him to remove some of its key members. The idea was 
welcomed at least by two top officials in the administration, because handwritten on this 
same memo was the note: “Fred [Iklè, Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy] and I like this 
a lot!!” with the signature of John Poindexter (McFarlane‟s successor as National Security 
Advisor).
70
 
While ideas about regime change started to gain ground inside the administration, the 
intelligence seemed to deny that the overthrow of Qadhafi would bring any good to the 
United States. A CIA report in April had examined the issue concluding that there were two 
possible outcomes, both presenting risks for the US: either a military government which 
would have to prove its anti-Western stance to “dispel the inevitable suspicions at home and 
abroad that the US put it in power”, or an “extremist-dominated government that could 
become an even greater threat to US interests than the Qadhafi regime”.71 Such an analysis 
apparently did little to stop those inside the administration who advocated for regime change 
for Libya. In late July 1986, Reagan, Casey, Weinberger and Shultz gave their approval to the 
plan for regime change, which started to be implemented one month later.
72
 
On August 25, the Wall Street Journal wrote that the administration was planning an 
attack on Libya.
73
 To increase tension in Libya, military actions had been carefully planned 
by Weinberger to give the impression of an ongoing build-up.
74
 In fact, no new strike could 
take place both because of Western European opposition – including the British who had 
supported the strike in April – and because, as former Acting US Ambassador in Moscow 
Jack Matlock had warned, the Soviets would consider a new strike as a challenge to their 
credibility in the third world.
75
 The whole operation backfired on those who had devised it on 
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October 2, when Bob Woodward of the Washington Post disclosed the administration‟s 
intent.
76
 
The ascendance of this ideology in the Reagan administration ended in November 
1986, when the first news of the Iran-Contra affair was published in the American press. The 
scandal would end the careers of some of the prominent “hawks” against terrorism inside the 
administration, such as North, Poindexter and McFarlane. The re-shuffle inside the 
administration would bring to the fore people like General Colin Powell as National Security 
Advisor and Frank Carlucci as Secretary of Defense who both supported a more nuanced, 
regionalist and diplomatic policy towards the Middle East. The crescendo towards a “war for 
civilization” would momentarily stop though some of the ideas and concepts created during 
the Reagan administration would survive its end. 
Conclusions 
The Cold War was an important factor in the shaping of the Reagan administration‟s policy 
against Middle Eastern terrorism. It affected their understanding of reality, their choice of 
friends and foes and the way they presented global issues to the public and to Congress. The 
Cold War was also the tool used by regional actors to attract American support. Presenting 
their local enemies as Soviet clients was, often, a good way to generate sympathy and aid 
(both financial and military) from US policy-makers. As Malcolm Yapp has stated, “the 
dominant feature [of the Cold War in the Middle East] was the manipulation of the 
international powers by regional powers”, with the Cold War paradigm acting as one of the 
main tools of this manipulation. Thus, while the goal of many “globalists” inside the 
administration was to strengthen America‟s role in the region, this attitude actually gave more 
leverage to regional actors who used it to manipulate the superpower.
77
 
This was not the only problem created by the use of Cold War paradigms in the Middle 
East of the 1980s. First of all, the unbalanced mix between the globalist and the regionalist 
approaches led the US to commit mistakes in Lebanon which, on a smaller scale, resembled 
those of the Soviets in Afghanistan.
78
 Secondly, although Cold War paradigms had always 
been important in shaping US policy in the Middle East, this seemed particularly out of place 
in the 1980s because the events of the late 1970s had created cleavages which had little or 
nothing to do with this bipolar confrontation. After the Iranian Revolution, the region was 
increasingly removed from the Cold War, yet American policy-makers still relied on the Cold 
War paradigm. 
Terrorism was perceived by many members of the Reagan administration as a new 
threat, though they framed it as a new technique employed by old enemies. Understanding the 
transformations ushered into the politics of the Middle East by the events of 1979 was not an 
impossible task. In the first days of 1985, Richard Nixon produced a document with advice 
for the Reagan administration in its second term. His (rather prophetic) analysis was quite 
different from that of the White House: 
The major danger of war in the next ten years is not in Europe but in the Third World. And the 
most crucial area is the Mideast and the Persian Gulf [...] We must recognize that the major 
destabilizing and dangerous factor in the Middle East is not the communist revolution but the 
Moslem/Fundamentalist revolution [...] Even without Soviet assistance, the Khomeinis and the 
Qadafis will continue to try to export their revolutions [...] Military power will not decide this 
conflict in the Third World. We could have military superiority across the board and still lose. 
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Nuclear weapons are irrelevant (...)conventional weapons and rapid deployment forces serve a 
purpose but are not effective when aggression is not over borders, as in Korea, but under 
borders by Soviet- and radical Moslem-supported revolutionaries.
79
 
Reagan‟s policy, though, was not simply the continuation of Cold War policies in the Middle 
East. His administration did produce new ideas and new concepts which acquired a new 
relevance in light of the War on Terror declared by the administration of George W. Bush. 
The idea of terrorism as warfare against the West would be reinforced by the nature of the 
attacks on 9/11; the necessity of using pre-emptive strikes as well as regime change against 
states which sponsor terrorists would likewise gain prominence. Even the list of countries 
listed as sponsors of terrorism in the Reagan years resembled that of the Bush years. 
Nonetheless, these elements of continuity are not enough to say that the Reagan years 
were already part of World War 4: there was no global War on Terror in the 1980s. Though 
Middle Eastern terrorism was always high on Reagan‟s agenda, it never overcame other 
global priorities as happened after 9/11 for George W. Bush,
80
 and indeed the main point here 
is how the Cold War logic framed the understanding of Middle Eastern terrorism in the 
1980s.  
It is more appropriate to view the Reagan administration as a breeding ground for what 
came after 9/11. Reagan‟s legacy could be taken or left by those who came after him. While 
some ideas were elaborated and examples produced, in the end these did not become a 
comprehensive policy. Overall, the Reagan administration, when faced with the emergence of 
new and extremely diverse forms of radicalism in the Middle East, failed to produce a 
comprehensive analysis of the motives, aims, structure, and basis of popular support of these 
movements. In the end, nothing even close to the depth of analysis enclosed in George 
Kennan‟s “long telegram” was drafted by anyone in the administration – or if it was drafted 
and is still classified, it never gained a similar influence. Context and understanding of 
diversities were sacrificed in order to have a global framework that could justify a foreign 
policy whose main task had an important domestic dimension: the restoration of American 
power and will after the weaknesses exposed by the Vietnam years. 
Finally, Reagan‟s policy in the Middle East neglected non-state actors like the Abu 
Nidal Organization. It stuck to an idea of terrorism as a synonym of “insurgency” which had 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s, as Timothy Naftali has noted. This came together with the 
idea of state-sponsorship: behind every insurgency lay either the USSR or China.
81
 A 
language and a conceptual framework conceived for Latin America or Asia (the locations of 
insurgencies in the 1960s and 1970s) were then partially used for the Middle East of the 
1980s. Despite receiving occasional warnings about the nature of organisations like Abu 
Nidal‟s, the administration seemed incapable of conceiving of a world where an independent 
organisation, using nation-states as mere assets without obeying their agendas, could cause 
major trouble for the United States. The Abu Nidal Organization created part of the casus 
belli for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon – which in turn prompted an American intervention 
in the country – and of the US attack against Libya in 1986. The relevance of non-state actors 
in global terrorism is part of another, more recent, story. The misunderstanding of their nature 
and danger, though, is part of the same legacy that this article has tried to investigate. 
For all these reasons, it is important to understand how the context of the Reagan 
administration shaped ideas and policies which were fully developed when the Cold War was 
over and which would have been unthinkable without the unipolar moment. While asking 
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ourselves how much of Bush‟s War on Terror was already there in the Reagan years, we 
should also use scholarship to understand how much of Reagan‟s Cold War mentality was 
still there in the Bush years. 
